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　 Many empirical studies argue that the inertial behavior of the policy rates in
industrialized countries can be well explained by a linear partial adjustment version
of the Taylor rule. However, the explanatory power of the lagged interest rate has
been questioned from various points of view. This paper formally examines a situation
in which a central bank has an aversion for frequent policy reversals. Imposing an
irreversibility constraint on the control space makes the lagged interest rate a state
variable, but the policy function cannot then be expressed as a partial adjustment
form even if the original Taylor rule is the correct policy function in the absence of
the constraint. The simulation results reveal that the conventional regression tends to
falsely support the functionally misspeciﬁed partial adjustment model. This implies
that the signiﬁcant role of the lagged interest may simply reﬂect the central banks’
reversal aversion.
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1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that the credibility of central banks is a key to the eﬀectiveness of
monetary policy. Major central banks thus have an aversion for losing credibility, and that
this aversion would make them behave conservatively, especially when the future economic
condition is highly uncertain.
The gradual adjustment of the policy rates has long been deemed as good evidence
of the central banks’ preference for conservatism. The most popular way to measure the
extent of gradualism is to estimate the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate in the following
Taylor rule:
it = ψiit−1 + (1− ψi)(c0 + c1πt + c2yt),
where it is the policy rate at time t, and πt and yt are inﬂation and an output gap,
respectively. This partial adjustment version of the Taylor rule, which is occasionally
called the “generalized Taylor rule”, has been heavily used not only in empirical studies,
but also in theoretical studies especially in the new-Keynesian DSGE models (e.g., Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999, Woodford, 2003a,b).1
Despite its popularity, the partial adjustment version of the Taylor rule has been criti-
cized. Rudebusch (2002) argues that if the central bank conducts interest rate smoothing,
then future short-term interest rates must be predicted quite accurately. He shows that
the predictability of future short-term rates is not high enough to support interest rate
smoothing, insisting that the explanatory power of the lagged interest rate is due to the
presence of serially correlated omitted variables. Sack (2000) states that the presence of
parameter uncertainty would lead the Fed to act less aggressively compared to the optimal
policy under certainty. Trehan and Wu (2007) show that failing to include the time-varying
equilibrium real interest rate in the estimation equation can exaggerate the degree of in-
terest rate smoothing. More recently, Consolo and Favero (2009) reestimate the Taylor
rule using GMM, taking into account the possibility of weak instruments. They show that
GMM estimation that takes care of the weak instruments problem makes the estimated
coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate signiﬁcantly smaller than suggested by the previous
studies.
In this paper, I present an alternative explanation about why the partial adjustment
model can be incorrect. I consider a situation in which a central bank has an aversion
for frequent policy reversals. In practice, the central banks apparently try to avoid policy
reversals, since reversals send a signal to the market that the policy shifts may be modiﬁed
or even neutralized in the near future. Such a possibility of altering policy directions
undermines the central bank’s credibility and thereby the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy.
As of December 2009, the Fed has changed the Federal funds target 95 times since 1990,
and there are only two cases in which the Fed changed the direction of the policy shift
1See Sack and Wieland (2000) for a survey of the literature on interest rate smoothing.
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within two quarters. In fact, the shortest interval between opposite target shifts is about
5 months (Figure 1). This aspect of infrequent policy reversals is inconsistent with the
quarterly partial adjustment model that allows for immediate reversals.
The possibility that an aversion for policy reversals would lead the central banks to be
conservative is pointed out by Lowe and Ellis (1997), while I introduce the central banks’
reversal aversion in a more formal way. I consider a situation in which the central bank faces
an irreversibility constraint that prohibits the policy rate to move in opposite directions
over the two consecutive periods. This can be interpreted as a special case of the situation
in which the central bank bears the cost of policy-rate reversals without any restriction
on the control space. Thus, as noted by Lowe and Ellis (1997), this discussion is similar
to the irreversibility of investment (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The introduction of
irreversibility makes the optimal policy less aggressive than would be attained under no
constraint. This is simply because a larger policy shift would increase the probability that
the policy rate must be reversed in the next period. In other words, there arises an option
value to wait as is the case with investment irreversibility.
The simulation results reveal that the conventional regression tends to yield a wrong
conclusion that the linear partial adjustment model is correct. Obviously, the linear partial
adjustment equation is functionally misspeciﬁed and omits an important state variable as
long as the central bank faces the irreversibility constraint. I also show that the applica-
tion of English, Nelson and Sack’s (2003) speciﬁcation test, which simultaneously allows
for both the partial adjustment term and serial correlations, would not correctly detect
the misspeciﬁcation. This suggests that the widely used partial adjustment model may
be falsely accepted since the policy rates under irreversibility are observationally indistin-
guishable from those under the partial adjustment model. If this is the case, the use of the
partial adjustment version of the Taylor rule in a theoretical study will be subject to the
Lucas critique.
2 A simple model of gradualism
This section presents a very simple model in which there is no interaction between the
central bank’s policy action and the desired level of interest rate for the purpose of clarifying
the pure eﬀect of introducing an irreversibility constraint. Assume that the central bank
knows the process of the desired interest rate, which is given as
i∗t = ρi
∗
t−1 + εt, ρ ∈ [0, 1), (1)
where i∗t is the current desired interest rate and εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε ). i∗t is called the “desired”
interest rate in the sense that the central bank always sets its policy rate, it, at i∗t if there
is no restriction on the behavior of the policy rate. However, if the central bank has an
aversion for frequent policy reversals, then i∗t is not necessarily the optimal interest rate
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since the previous policy rate becomes an upper (a lower) bound for the current policy rate
when the policy rate was previously lowered (increased).
A central bank that has an aversion for policy reversals not only avoids current pol-
icy reversal, but also takes into account the inﬂuence of its current policy action on the
likelihood of future policy reversals. For example, suppose that the desired level of the
interest rate is currently quite high, but is likely to decline in the next period. In this
situation, an upward shift in the policy rate will increase the probability of policy reversal
(i.e., a negative policy shift) in the next period. The central bank may decide to keep the
level of the policy rate unchanged if such a future policy reversal is highly likely. Thus, the
decision-making of a central bank that tries to avoid frequent policy reversals is intrinsically
a dynamic problem and the optimal policy will be forward-looking.
Assume that the central bank has a quadratic return function that takes the maxi-
mum value zero when the policy rate is equal to i∗t . One way to incorporate the central
bank’s reversal aversion is to directly introduce an irreversibility constraint in the Bellman
equation:
V (it−1, δt−1, i∗t ) = max
it∈Ωt
{−(it − i∗t )2 + βEtV (it, δt, i∗t+1)}, (2)
where V (·) is the value function of the central bank, δt = sign(it − it−1) and β is the
discount factor. The control space for it is constrained by Ωt, where
Ωt = {it| it ≤ it−1, it ∈ Ω} if δt−1 = −1,
= Ω if δt−1 = 0, (3)
= {it| it ≥ it−1, it ∈ Ω} if δt−1 = 1.
Ω denotes the overall control space. There are three state variables in the value function.
The most obvious one is the desired level of the policy rate.2 In addition, it−1 and δt−1
become state variables since they determine the current control space. It should be noted
that the current policy not only aﬀects the one-period return, −(it − i∗t )2, but also deter-
mines the next period’s state variables it and δt, which constrain the future control space.
It is this forward-looking aspect that creates the possibility that the central bank favors
gradualism.
Another possible way to examine the central bank’s aversion for policy reversals is to
introduce penalties or costs of reversals. In this case, the control space is not constrained
by the direction of previous policy shifts, but policy reversals impose penalties or costs
on the central bank through the one-period return function. This type of problem setting
is called the penalty method or the barrier method, in which case the solution could be
obtained by a perturbation method once the constraint is rewritten as ΔitΔit−1 ≥ 0.3
However, a shortcoming of the penalty method is that the problem is not exactly the
2It is assumed that the i∗t is observable at the time the central bank sets it.
3See, for example, Luenberger (2003) for an explanation of the penalty and barrier methods.
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same as the corresponding constrained problem unless the size of the penalty is inﬁnite
outside the boundary. den Haan and Wind (2009) also argue that for the perturbation
methods to be accurate, the penalty function must not have a singularity, say x∗, since
the radius of convergence of the Taylor series is bounded above by ||x¯ − x∗||, where x¯ is
the point at which the approximation is based.4 This requires the penalty function or
the barrier function to be diﬀerentiable at the boundary, but this is done at the expense
of solution accuracy around the boundary. These properties will cause a serious problem
since the irreversibility constraint demands arbitrary accuracy around the boundary due to
the fact that the next period’s control space depends largely on sign(Δit). For this reason,
introducing a penalty function or a barrier function will be inappropriate for a problem
with the irreversibility constraint.
2.1 Stochastic simulation
The introduction of an irreversibility constraint makes the central bank’s policy function
highly nonlinear, and an analytical solution is thus no longer available even in this otherwise
simple linear-quadratic framework. In the following, I solve the dynamic programming
numerically using value function iteration.
The baseline parameters and grid sizes are as follows. β = .9, σε = .005 and I consider
two alternative cases regarding the persistence of the desired interest rate: ρ = .8 and
0. Ω = [−.03, .03], and the grid size for state it−1 is set at .0025. As for i∗t , the AR(1)
process is discretized by the method proposed by Tauchen (1986). The number of nodes
for i∗t is 11.5 The optimal policy in each iteration is obtained by using a modiﬁed golden
search algorithm, where the optimal value attained by the standard golden search method
is compared with the value under no policy shift (i.e., it = it−1). Such a modiﬁcation
is necessary because the standard golden search method often fails to calculate corner
solutions.6 The next period’s expected value is approximated using piece-wise linear spline
at points not on the grid.7 The approximated value function is given by
V (ˆij , δˆk, iˆ∗l ) = max
i¯∈Ωj,k
{−(¯i− iˆ∗l )2 + β
11∑
m=1
P (l,m)V (¯i, sign(¯i− iˆj), iˆ∗m)}, (4)
where the current control space depends on indices j and k since the space is determined
by the previous interest, iˆj, and the previous increment, δˆk. P (l,m) denotes the transition
probability from state iˆ∗l to iˆ
∗
m.
Figure 2 illustrates sample paths of the policy rate and the desired rate. The ﬁgure
shows that there is a large discrepancy between the two interest rates. The point is that
4See also Judd (1998, Theorem 6.1.2).
5The maximum and minimum values of i∗t are .015 and -.015, respectively.
6Recall that it−1 becomes an upper or a lower bound of it when δt−1 is nonzero. See Miranda and
Fackler (2002) for an explanation of the standard golden search algorithm.
7The criterion of convergence is ||V k(·)−V k−1(·)
V k−1(·) ||∞ < 10−6, where V k(·) is the value after kth iterations.
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the discrepancy is not observed only when the irreversibility constraint is binding. The
policy rate often deviates from the desired rate when the constraint is not binding. The
latter phenomenon corresponds to the central bank’s gradualism, where the central bank
moves the policy rate to a lesser extent than the change in the desired rate. As noted
above, this is because a larger shift in the policy rate will increase the probability of the
next period’s policy reversal.
Another interesting feature is that the size of the discrepancy between the policy rate
and the desired rate depends on the degree of persistence, ρ. It turns out that, on average,
the discrepancy is wider under ρ = 0 than under ρ = .8. The intuition is that the central
bank follows changes in the desired rate more frequently as the degree of persistence in-
creases since the probability of reversal in the desired rate is decreasing in ρ. This implies
that the extent of gradualism is endogenously determined, depending on the behavior of
the desired rate.
Figure 3 shows the policy function when it−1 = 0. The two ﬁgures reconﬁrm the two
properties shown in the simulated paths: i) the central bank that faces the irreversibility
constraint conducts gradual monetary policy even when the constraint is not binding, and
ii) the degree of gradualism depends on the degree of persistence in i∗t . In particular, Figure
3a reveals that it is optimal to do nothing when the change in the desired rate is suﬃciently
small and the persistence of the desired rate is suﬃciently small. The relationship between
the extent of gradualism and the persistence in i∗t is far from linear.
2.2 Conventional regression: A partial adjustment model
Since the inﬂuential work by Taylor (1993), a large number of empirical studies have
attempted to estimate a simple policy rule, and many of them supports a linear partial
adjustment model of the form:
it = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi)ci∗i∗t + ξt, (5)
where ξt is a residual term and i∗t typically represents the original Taylor rule, or the
“Taylor rate”, that depends only on inﬂation and an output gap.
Eq.(5) is obviously not a correct policy function in the presence of the irreversibility
constraint, while the gradual adjustment of the simulated optimal policy shown in Figure 2
does not seem inconsistent with the partial adjustment model. Even in theoretical studies,
it is often assumed that the linear partial adjustment model can well capture the actual
central banks’ conservative behavior, which is called “interest rate smoothing”. However,
if the central banks’ conservativeness stems from the aversion for policy reversals, then
such a conventional assumption will not hold true.
One might argue that the partial adjustment model may still describe the central banks’
conservatism as ﬁrst-order approximation to the possibly nonlinear policy function. Unfor-
tunately, the policy function under the irreversibility constraint is not only nonlinear, but
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also depends on additional state variable δt−1. Therefore, any linear partial adjustment
model is functionally misspeciﬁed even around the steady state.
In the following I estimate eq.(5), using simulated data obtained by the model presented
in the previous subsection. If the estimated values of ρi and ci∗ are statistically signiﬁcant,
then the possibility arises that the conventional regression of the partial adjustment model
may be spurious.
2.3 Estimation results
Since the data used in the previous studies are mostly quarterly and start from the late
80’s, I set the length of simulated data used in the estimation at 100. In doing so, I
generated 5000 sets of 200-period-long data, and the initial 99 periods were discarded.8
The distributions of the OLS estimates are shown in Figures 4 and 5.
First, it turns out that the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate, ρi, is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0 in both cases and its size tends to be larger under ρ = 0 than under ρ = .8.
This diﬀerence in the estimated values of ρi can be thought of as reﬂecting the extent of
discrepancy between the policy rate and desired rate. Second, the coeﬃcient on i∗t , ci∗ , is
less than 1 in most cases, while ci∗ should be unity under the assumption that the linear
partial adjustment model is correct.
Figures 4d and 5d also show that the Breusch-Godfrey’s LM test often fails to reject the
null hypothesis that the OLS residuals are serially uncorrelated.9 Although, in general, the
presence of omitted variables often makes the OLS residuals serially correlated, the result
that serial correlations are not detected does not necessarily mean that the estimated
equation correctly contains all the true explanatory variables. Obviously, the estimated
policy rule is functionally misspeciﬁed in terms of nonlinearity and a key state variable
δt−1 is incorrectly omitted from the model. The Monte Carlo experiments reveal that this
type of error is more likely to occur as the desired rate becomes more persistent.
This simple simulation exercise clearly states that the OLS estimation of the function-
ally misspeciﬁed equation can easily lead to an incorrect conclusion that the actual policy
rate can be expressed by a linear partial adjustment model. Recall that the above results
are obtained under the assumption that the current desired rate, i∗t , is known with cer-
tainty. Many empirical studies focus on correctly estimating the Taylor rate i∗t , but the
conventional regression would be inappropriate even if we have accurate information about
the Taylor rate.
8I discarded 99 periods, not 100 periods, since lagged data are needed.
9The Durbin-Watson test is inappropriate when the regression contains a lagged dependent variable, for
the test statistic will be biased toward a ﬁnding of no serial correlation (e.g., Nerlove and Wallis, 1966).
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3 The Ball-Svensson backward-looking model
3.1 The basic framework
Thus far, I examined the situation in which the central bank’s policy action does not aﬀect
the level of the desired interest rate. In practice, however, explanatory variables in the
policy rule, typically inﬂation and an output gap, are inevitably aﬀected by the policy rule
itself. This section employs a simple structural model in order to take into account the
interaction between the policy rule and its explanatory variables.
The economic structure is expressed by the following Ball-Svensson’s model:10
yt+1 = ρyyt − δy(it − Etπt+1) + νt+1, (6)
πt+1 = γππt + απyt + ηt+1, (7)
where yt is an output gap and πt is the rate of inﬂation. νt+1 and ηt+1 are white noises
whose variances are σ2ν and σ
2
η, respectively. Since the expected inﬂation is expressed as
Etπt+1 = γππt + απyt, the output gap in period t + 1 leads to
yt+1 = (ρy + δyαπ)yt − δyit + γπδyπt + νt+1. (8)
A virtue of this simple backward model is that the standard Taylor rule is obtained
as the optimal policy function. To see this, assume that the central bank has a quadratic
one-period return function. The Bellman equation is written as11
V (yt, πt) = max
it
{−y2t − λπ2t + βEtV (yt+1, πt+1)}. (9)
It can be easily shown that the policy function leads to






(γππt + αyyt), (10)
where a = (−(1 − λβα2π − βγ2π) +
√
(1− λβα2π − βγ2π)2 + 4λβα2π)/(2βα2π). Thus, in the
absence of any restriction on the policy space, the optimal policy is to follow the Taylor
rule without the lagged interest term.
Now, let us deﬁne the problem under the irreversibility constraint. The Bellman equa-
tion is written as
V (it−1, δt−1, yt, πt) = max
it∈Ωt
{−y2t − λπ2t + βEtV (it, δt, yt+1, πt+1)}, (11)
10See Ball (1999) and Svensson (1997). Kato and Nishiyama (2005) investigate the eﬀect of the zero-
lower bound for the policy rates within this model. The only diﬀerence from their model is that I allow the
non-unitary coeﬃcient on πt, γπ. The reason for this modiﬁcation is described below.
11Since it does not aﬀect either πt or yt, the Bellman equation can be reformulated by employing Etyt+1
and Etπt+1 as a control variable and a state, respectively. However, I use eq.(9) in the following since i)
the values of πt and yt are needed in estimation and ii) the irreversibility constraint should be deﬁned with
respect to the policy rate.
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where control space Ωt is deﬁned in the same way as (3).
Since the Taylor rate can be deﬁned as i˜t, the partial adjustment equation to be esti-
mated should be written as
it = φiit−1 + (1− φi)˜it + ξt
= φiit−1 + (1− φi)(φππt + φyyt) + ξt. (12)
The coeﬃcients φi, φπ and φy will be estimated simultaneously.
3.2 Simulation
The parameter values are as follows: λ = 1, ρy = δy = γπ = .3 and απ = .05. The parameter
values for structural equations are all set at levels smaller than those used in Kato and
Nishiyama (2007) for two reasons. First, the aim of the simulation is not to replicate the
actual moment size of economic variables. Second, employing larger coeﬃcients increases
the possibility of extrapolation when calculating the expected value. Since extrapolation
often undermines the accuracy of value function approximation, I set parameters suﬃciently
small so that extrapolation is not needed. In doing so, I searched for the largest parameter
combination by gradually lowering each parameter value.
Determination of the overall control space Ω should also be done with great care. Since
our focus is neither on the upper nor the lower bound of interest rate, but on the eﬀect
of the irreversibility constraint, any inﬂuence of restrictions other than the irreversibility
constraint must be eliminated. To do this, I chose a suﬃciently large control space so that
the Taylor rate would be covered for all nodes of (yt, πt). Given that the optimal policy
under the irreversibility constraint is more conservative compared to the policy under no
constraint, this choice of control space will cover all the nodes for the optimal interest rate
under irreversibility.
Speciﬁcally, the maximum and minimum nodes for it−1 are .1 and -.1, respectively. The
maximum and minimum nodes for yt are .08 and -.08, respectively, while the maximum
and minimum nodes for πt are .04 and -.04, respectively. The grid size is .005 for all states
other than δt−1. The distributions for shocks, ν and η, are obtained in the same way as
above, where the variances are both set at .012. The number of nodes for each shock is
9. With these parameter values, the theoretical values of φy and φπ are 1.05 and 0.31,
respectively.12 The numerical value function is written as








qν,mqη,sV (¯i, sign(¯i− iˆj), yˆ+(yˆl, πˆn, i¯, νˆm), πˆ+(yˆl, πˆn, ηˆs))},(13)
12In this model, the well known Taylor principle does not need to be satisﬁed to ensure a stable process
for inﬂation and output. It can be shown that the solution is stable under a wide range of reasonable
parameter values.
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where yˆ+(yˆl, πˆn, i¯, νˆm)=(ρy+δyαπ)yˆl−δy i¯+γπδyπˆn+νˆm and πˆ+(yˆl, πˆn, ηˆs)=γππˆn+απyˆl+ηˆs.
qν,m and qη,s are probabilities that νt+1 and ηt+1 are in states νm and ηs, respectively.
The paths of the optimal interest rate and the Taylor rate, i˜t, are shown in Figure
6. The fundamental properties are the same as those observed in Figure 2: the policy
rate often deviates from the Taylor rate in periods when the irreversibility constraint is
not binding. This can also be conﬁrmed by Figure 7, which illustrates policy responses to
output and inﬂation.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the OLS estimates of the coeﬃcients in (12). The
coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate, φi, is estimated to be around .4 and is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Interestingly, as is the case with the simple model above, the estimated
coeﬃcients on inﬂation and output are both biased downward. This has an important
implication that the central banks’ conservatism could not be captured only by the lagged
interest rate. In the literature, it is often presumed that the value of φi represents the de-
gree of policy inertia, but the inﬂuence of conservatism would also aﬀect the coeﬃcients in
the Taylor rate. This suggests that the central banks in industrialized countries may have
had more hawkish Taylor rates over the past two decades than suggested by the previous
empirical studies.
As argued in the previous sections, the optimal policy under the irreversibility constraint
may lead to a misleading conclusion that the inertial policy rule can be expressed as a partial
adjustment model. The analysis of this section shows that such a misperception could also
occur in an environment in which the policy rate and its explanatory variables interact
with each other. The coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate can be viewed as reﬂecting the
central bank’s gradualism stemming from the irreversibility constraint, which should be
distinguished from the conventional interest rate smoothing expressed by the linear partial
adjustment model.
4 The English-Nelson-Sack test
Rudebusch (2002, 2006) argue that the explanatory power of the lagged interest rate in the
Taylor rule arises if a serially correlated variable is incorrectly omitted from the estimated
equation. If this is the case, the standard estimation of the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest
will be biased due to the omitted variables, and the lagged interest rate cannot be able to
correctly capture the extent of gradualism.
Based on this argument, English, Nelson and Sack (2003) proposed a hypothetical
function that allows for both serially correlated residuals and the lagged interest rate. The
equations to be simultaneously taken into account are:
it = φiit−1 + (1− φi)˜it + ut, (14)
ut = θut−1 + ζt, (15)
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where, as above, i˜t is the Taylor rate, ut is the possibly serially correlated residual, and ζt
is a white noise. Combining the two equations yields
Δit = (1− φi)Δi˜t + (1− φi)(1− θ)(˜it−1 − it−1) + φiθΔit−1 + ζt,
= b1Δi˜t + b2(˜it−1 − it−1) + b3Δit−1 + ζt. (16)
As long as θ is nonnegative, the estimation result will be one of the following four cases
1. b1 = b2 = 1, b3 = 0: No inertia, no serial correlation,
2. b1 = 1, b2 ∈ (0, 1), b3 = 0: No inertia, serial correlation,
3. b1, b2 ∈ (0, 1), b3 = 0: Inertia, no serial correlation,
4. b1, b2, b3 ∈ (0, 1): Inertia, serial correlation.
English, Nelson and Sack (2003), Gerlach-Kristen (2004) and Castelnuovo (2007) show that
case 4 is most likely. Here, I estimate b1, b2 and b3 without imposing parameter restrictions.
Let us ﬁrst consider the simplest model of section 2. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the
distributions of the OLS estimates. It turns out that the coeﬃcients b1, b2 and b3 are
all greater than zero and less than one in most cases. This is consistent with the results
obtained by English, Nelson and Sack (2003), Gerlach-Kristen (2004) and Castelnuovo
(2007), who insist that the joint formalization of the two hypotheses will be the best
approximation to policy rules. Figure 11 shows the estimation results under the backward-
looking model. The ﬁgure states that the essential results are the same as those of the
simple model.
Obviously, the theoretically correct policy function under irreversibility cannot be es-
timated by (16) even if one allows for the possibility of serially correlated errors. The
“statistically signiﬁcant” serially correlated errors (ut) arose as a result of failing to incor-
porate nonlinearity and state variable δt−1, which would make a standard OLS estimation
inconsistent. Therefore, the English, Nelson and Sack’s modiﬁcation to the traditional re-
gression will not work when the central banks’ gradualism stems from irreversibility. The
results illustrated in Figures 9, 10 and 11 reveal that it would be hard to distinguish be-
tween the irreversible monetary policy and the inertial policy under the partial adjustment
model just by looking at the estimates of the nested equation eq.(16).
5 Term structure implications
While the above results suggest observational equivalence between the policies under the
irreversibility constraint and the policies based on the partial adjustment form, there re-
mains another question: which type of policy is more plausible as a description of the Fed’s
behavior? To address this issue, it is useful to recall Rudebusch’s (2002, 2006) argument
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that the actual policy rate contains less information about future policies than suggested
by the partial adjustment model.
Unfortunately, however, the simulated statistics obtained by using the simple models
above cannot be directly compared with the actual statistics shown by Rudebusch since the
models are too simple to capture quantitative details. Therefore, I conduct some exercises
to show the relation between the policy rate and future interest rates. It could be said that
for the irreversible policies to be plausible, the policy rate under irreversibility should not
have much information about future policies.
5.1 The term structure regression
Firstly, let us consider the standard term structure regression employed by Rudebusch
(2002):
it+j − it+j−1 = c0 + c1(Etit+j − Etit+j−1) + ξt+j, j = 1, 2, 3. (17)
Under rational expectations, it+j = Etit+j + et+j , where et+j denotes the expectational
error which has no correlation with time-t information. Therefore, it is expected that
c0 = 0 and c1 = 1 if the future changes in the short-term rates are forecast in an unbiased
manner. Moreover, if the current policy rate has suﬃcient information to forecast future
policy rates, then the obtained R2 would take a value close to one.
In order to obtain simulated data on expected interest rates, an “expectations function”
needs to be obtained by conducting simulation since it is impossible to obtain interest
expectations analytically. Here, I adopt the following procedure:
1. For a given combination of state variables, 500 sets of (n + 1)-period-long interest
rate data are generated.
2. The mean of period (j +1)’s simulated interest rates is calculated for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
3. Repeat steps 1-2 for all the combinations of state variables.
I obtained expectations functions of various horizons up to 3 periods ahead (i.e., n = 3).
Table 1 reports the 95% conﬁdence intervals for c1 and R2 under alternative models.13
It shows that the predictive power of the current policy rate, which is measured by R2,
deteriorates dramatically as the forecast horizon increases, although the predictive accuracy
is not very diﬀerent between j = 1 and 2 in the backward-looking model. Judging from
Rudebusch’s (2002) discussion that the forecastability of 2-period-ahead policy shift is
very low, R2 in the case of j = 2 in the backward model seems too high.14 This would
be because there are too many cases where the constraint is binding. For example, if it
13The case of ρ = 0 under the simple model is not considered since the current desired rate has no
predictive power regarding future interest rates.
14Rudebusch (2002) reports that R2 is 0.11 when j = 2.
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is highly likely that the constraint is binding in the next period, then the forecast of the
next policy rate will necesarily be accurate. In other words, the simulated Taylor rate
may unrealistically exhibit many reversals. In fact, the conﬁdence interval of R2 regarding
the forecast of the 2-period-ahead Taylor rate’s shift takes very low values because of the
frequent reversals in the Taylor rate. In the simple model, where reversals in the desired
rate are less frequent, R2 under the irreversible policy is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
that under the no-constraint policy. This would be indirect evidence that the actual desired
rate is persistent enough to prohibit the irreversibility constraint from binding frequently.
In the case of j = 3, on the other hand, R2 is very close to zero in both models.
5.2 The policy rate’s correlation with long-term rates
Many authors, such as Goodfriend (1991), Amato and Laubach (1999) and Woodford
(2003b), argue that policy rate smoothing is useful for controlling long-term interest rates
since market participants are more likely to expect current policy shift to continue as the
persistence of the policy rate increases. On the other hand, the actual policy rate would
not have a close correlation with long-term rates if Rudebusch’s argument is correct.
Figure 12 illustrates the correlation between the policy rate and long-term interest rates
under the expectations theory. The ﬁgure shows that if persistence in the policy rate comes
from the central bank’s reversal aversion, then the conventional argument is not necessar-
ily correct. While the introduction of policy irreversibility can increase the correlation
between the policy rate and interest rates of relatively short maturities, it weakens the
correlation of the policy rate with longer-term rates. This is because forecasting the value
of the additional state δt+k becomes more diﬃcult as the time horizon k increases, and the
presence of this additional state variable turns into a disturbing factor when k is suﬃciently
large. This kind of non-monotonic impact of gradualism on the relation between long- and
short-term interest rates would not arise under the linear partial adjustment version of
the Taylor rule. Arguably, the result that the policy rate may have less correlation with
long-term rates than the desired rate would is also consistent with Rudebusch’s ﬁnding
that the current policy rate contains little information about future policies.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that the signiﬁcant role of the lagged coeﬃcient in the estimated Taylor
rule may reﬂect the central bank’s aversion for frequent policy reversals since the lagged
interest rate becomes a state variable in the presence of an irreversibility constraint. If
this is the case, the widely used partial adjustment model is functionally misspeciﬁed in
terms of nonlinearity and the presence of an omitted variable. This suggests that the
degree of policy inertia should be endogenously determined in accordance with the degree
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of persistence in the desired rate. The use of a partial adjustment policy rule in a theoretical
study thus lacks a microfoundation.
An important extension is to introduce forward-looking expectations in AS and IS
equations. While it is well understood within the linear quadratic framework that the virtue
of making the current policy rate dependent on the lagged policy rates comes from the
current policy rate’s increased inﬂuence on inﬂation expectations, it might not be the case
once policy irreversibility is taken into account. As discussed in section 5, “policy inertia”
stemming from the irreversibility constraint may make it even more diﬃcult to controll
long-term rates. One diﬃculty of introducing expectations in structural equations is to
maintain the accuracy of the solution. Considering nonlinear policies under irreversibility
will be hard to justify as long as the forward-looking AS and IS equations are obtained
by a linearization technique. Ideally, therefore, the model should be solved by a non-local
approximation method.
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j = 1 j = 2 j = 3
Simple model (ρ = .8)
c1 (irreversibility) (.748, 1.30) (.659, 1.62) (.588, 1.45)
c1 (no constraint) (.700, 1.81) (.641, 1.78) (.525, 1.80)
R2 (irreversibility) (.214, .506) (.086, .284) (.047, .198)
R2 (no constraint) (.069, .184) (.028, .139) (.010, .109)
Backward model
c1 (irreversibility) (.758, 1.10) (.857, 1.25) (.530, 1.47)
c1 (no constraint) (.846, 1.18) (-2.37, 4.24) (-9.99, 12.16)
R2 (irreversibility) (.475, .698) (.341, .586) (.040, .247)
R2 (no constraint) (.410, .573) (0, .036) (0, .029)
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Figure 1: The Federal funds target








(b) ρ = 0.8













Figure 2: Simulated paths: The simple model
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δt-1  = -1
δt-1  = 0
δt-1  = 1
desired rate
Figure 3: Policy function: The simple model








































Figure 4: Distribution of the OLS estimates of eq.(5): ρ = 0. (Dashed vertical line: the
95% critical value for the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic.)
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Figure 5: Distribution of the OLS estimates of eq.(5): ρ = .8. (Dashed vertical line: the
95% critical value for the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic.)
















Figure 6: Simulated paths: The backward-looking model
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Figure 7: Policy function: The backward-looking model




































(d) LM test statistic
Figure 8: Distribution of the OLS estimates of eq.(12): The backward-looking model
(Dashed vertical lines: theoretical values (b and c), the 95% critical value for the Breusch-
Godfrey LM test statistic (d) ).
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Figure 9: The OLS estimates of English-Nelson-Sack equation (16): ρ = 0. (Dashed vertical
line: the 95% critical value for the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic.)
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Figure 10: The OLS estimates of English-Nelson-Sack equation (16): ρ = .8. (Dashed
vertical line: the 95% critical value for the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic.)
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(d) LM test statistic
Figure 11: The OLS estimates of English-Nelson-Sack equation (16): The backward-looking
model (Dashed vertical line: the 95% critical value for the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statis-
tic.)
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(a) ρ = 0
(b) ρ = .8
(c) backward−looking model 
Figure 12: The correlation between the policy rate and long-term rates (solid line with
circles: correlations under irreversible policies. Solid line: correlations under no constraint
policies. 95% conﬁdence intervals for irreversible and no-constraint policies are illustrated
by dashed and dotted lines, respectively.)
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